La conférence* aura lieu le
mercredi 13 avril 2016 à 13h
Université du Québec à Montréal, salle W-5215
Conférencière: Kate Nolfi (University of Vermont)
«Epistemically Flawless False Beliefs»
A starting point for the sort of alethic epistemological approach that dominates both historical and contemporary western philosophy is that epistemic evaluation is evaluation with respect to a set of norms, standards, or ideals, characterized, at least in part, by appeal to some kind of substantive, perhaps explanatorily fundamental, normative relationship between belief and truth. Accordingly, on the alethic approach, false beliefs necessarily and inevitably fall short, epistemically speaking, simply by virtue of their falsity. I propose here an alternative to the alethic approach, one that is inspired by and fits naturally with recent developments in psychology and cognitive science, and which takes seriously the old idea that part of what makes belief the distinctive type of mental attitude it is is that beliefs have a specific action-enabling job to perform or purpose to fulfill—i.e. a constitutive, and explanatorily fundamental action-enabling proper function—within our mental economies. I argue that this sort of action-oriented approach in epistemology both can and should deny that falsity, in and of itself, inevitably constitutes a kind of epistemic imperfection in belief.
À propos de la conférencière/Bio:
Kate Nolfi is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vermont. Prior to joining the Philosophy Department at UVM, She received her PhD from UNC-Chapel Hill and her BA from Williams College. Her primary research interests lie at the intersection of epistemology, metaethics, and the philosophy of mind. Three questions guide most of her work: (1) « What are beliefs? » (2) « What does it take to believe in ways that conform with epistemic norms? » and (3) « Why it is that epistemic norms have the distinctive kind of normative authority and force that they have? » She approaches these questions as inextricably intertwined and with the conviction that they are most fruitfully explored as a set—her aim is to develop a unified epistemological account that answers all three.
*Cette conférence sera réalisée avec le précieux soutien du Canadian Journal of Philosophy.