La dixième conférence Fillosophie (jumellée avec CRISCo) aura lieu
le jeudi 30 avril 2015
à l’Université du Québec à Montréal
Conférencière invitée: Catarina Dutilh Novaes (U. Groningen, Pays Bas)
« Reasoning biases and non-monotonic logics: the case of preferential logics (joint work with Herman Veluwenkamp)»
Non-monotonic logics form a well-established group of theories both in philosophy and in artificial intelligence/computer science, but which have for the most part been neglected by psychologists and cognitive scientists working on reasoning. The main exception is the pioneering work of Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008; 2010). In this paper, we examine a group of experimental results not addressed by Stenning and van Lambalgen, namely the belief bias data, from the point of view of non-monotonic logics. Moreover, instead of adopting their preferred non-monotonic framework, closed-world reasoning, we adopt the family of non-monotonic logics known as preferential logics as the formal background for the discussion. The application of the framework to these empirical results, if successful, would suggest that these logics may represent a plausible descriptive model of human reasoning. However, the comparison with the data will also highlight the limitations of this framework. Indeed, while many instances in which participants seem to be performing deductive reasoning incorrectly can be equally explained as instances of participants in fact correctly performing defeasible reasoning, some of the experimental results to be discussed cannot be straightforwardly explained from the point of view of preferential logics. Instead, we argue that the data that preferential logics cannot account for can be more fruitfully analyzed from the point of view of belief-revision theory, in particular with the concept of screened revision. We conclude that, while it offers valuable insights into the nature of human reasoning, preferential logics are ultimately inadequate as formal models of the phenomena in question. Finally, these results provide the background for a number of general remarks on the very idea of formal modeling of human cognition.
À propos de la conférencière:
Catarina Dutilh Novaes is associate professor and Rosalind Franklin fellow at the Department of Theoretical Philosophy of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Groningen. She is also an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy and an editor for the Review of Symbolic Logic. Her main fields of research are history and philosophy of logic. She also has general interests in medieval philosophy, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, philosophy of mathematics, general philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and empirically-informed approaches to philosophy in general.
She has published many books, notably Formal Languages in Logic: A Philosophical and Cognitive Analysis (CUP, 2012)